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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this appeal by virtue of Rule 3 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure; Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; UCA 78-2a-3(2)(f); and 
by virtue of the fact that the case was poured over to this Court by the Utah Supreme Court pursuant 
to a letter dated September 26, 1994 from Geoffrey J. Butler directed to the Fourth District Court 
Clerk of Utah County. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
A. Did the trial court commit error by refusing to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute 
within 120 days? The standard of review is based upon a review of correctness of the trial court's 
conclusions of law. No deference is accorded to the trial court State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028, 1031 
(Utah 1991). 
B. Was the counsel afforded to the defendant ineffective? The standard of review is based 
upon an objective standard of reasonableness. No deference is accorded to the trial court, Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 
C. Was the evidence presented insufficient to support the verdict of the jury? The standard 
of review is based upon a review of the facts in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, State v. 
Saunders, 893 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah App. 1995). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated Title 77, Chapter 29, Section 1, Subsections (1) and (4) are presented 
for interpretation by this Court. Such subsections provide the following. 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the 
state prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, 
and there is pending against the prisoner in this state any untried 
indictment or information, and the prisoner shall deliver to the 
warden, sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or any appropriate 
agent of the same, a written demand specifying the nature of the 
charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting disposition 
of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge brought 
to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice. 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, 
or within such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his 
counsel moves to dismiss the action, the court shall review the 
proceeding, If the court finds that the failure of the prosecuting 
attorney to have the matter heard within the time required is not 
supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for continuance 
was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with 
prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case. This case involves a conviction of the defendant/appellant of an 
attempted burglary and the possession of a weapon by a restricted person. Defendant was 
incarcerated at the Utah State Prison during all relevant times of the proceedings. Accordingly, 
Defendant demanded that he have the charge brought to trial within 120 days. The trial was delayed 
by a motion from the prosection. Defendant's attorney brought a motion to dismiss the case which 
was denied by the trial court. 
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At trial, the defendant's counsel demonstrated that he did not have a proper knowledge of the 
rules of evidence and was admonished by the Court. In addition, defendant's counsel failed to bring 
a motion to suppress and/or brought the motion in an improper fashion. 
Finally, defendant has requested that this court review the evidence. Defendant feels that the 
evidence of identification was insufficient to support the verdict. 
B. The course of the proceedings. Defendant's motion to dismiss was brought on the 
morning of trial. The trial court refused to hear the motion at the time of trial, but gave leave to 
defendant's counsel to file the motion upon the completion of trial. Upon conclusion of the evidence, 
the jury found the defendant guilty of (1) Aggravated Burglary and (2) Possession of a Weapon by 
a Restricted Person. 
Following trial, counsel for the defendant filed his motion to dismiss on the basis of the court's 
failure to complete prosecution of the case within 120 days. The trial court denied the motion 
pursuant to a memorandum decision. 
C. Statement of facts. On September 14,1993, after conclusion of the preliminary hearing, 
defendant requested that his counsel prepare a demand for disposition of pending charges. His 
attorney prepared a hand written demand which was signed and delivered to the transporting officer 
from the Utah State Prison with the directive that he deliver it to his supervisor (R, at 149 and 150). 
On October 18, defendant, acting pro se, prepared an Affidavit of Impecuniosity and Demand 
for 120 Day Disposition and gave the documents to prison officials along with a request that they be 
mailed to the Fourth District Court. However, prison officials refused to mail the documents as 
directed, on the basis that the defendant did not have the money to pay for postage. The documents 
were, however, mailed to the Utah County Public Defender Association at no charge. Upon receipt 
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of the Demand for 120 Day Disposition and Affidavit of Impecuniosity, the Utah County Public 
Defender Association mailed the documents to June Hinckley, the record's officer at the Utah State 
Prison, with a cover letter dated October 27, 1993 (R, at 150). 
On October 28, 1993, Defendant was arraigned before the Honorable Boyd L. Park on the 
charges of Aggravated Burglary and Possession of a Weapon by a Restricted Person. Defendant 
entered a not guilty plea and requested a trial setting. A jury trial was set to commence on November 
8th and 9th of 1993 (R, at 16 and 17). 
On November 4, 1993, the prosecutor filed a motion to continue the trial setting. The motion 
was based upon the fact that State had been unable to locate an "essential witness", Diane Leroy, the 
trial court granted the states motion even though the State never called Ms. Leroy as a witness at the 
eventual trial (R, at 22 and 23). 
A new trial date was scheduled for February 7th and 8th of 1994 (R, at 44). 
On November 15,1993, June Hinckley sent a memorandum to the defendant, with an official 
form used by the prison to file a Demand for 120 Day Disposition. On November 18, 1993, the 
Defendant signed a Utah Department of Corrections Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending 
Charges. The form was delivered to prison officials on the date it was signed by the defendant, but 
the form was not received by June Hinckley until December 7, 1993. None of the above referenced 
documents were ever forwarded to the trial court. (R, at 150). 
On January 20, 1994, the State once again moved for a continuance. The grounds for the 
continuance were the same as the first motion for continuance, that being that an essential witness 
for the State would be unavailable for trial (R, at 43). 
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The trial court granted the State's motion and reset the trial for March 28th and 29th of 1994 
(R, at 46). 
It is interesting to note that the State filed a third motion for continuance on March 13, 1994 
based upon the grounds that its investigating officer would be out of town. Such motion, however, 
was denied (R, at 53). 
The trial finally commenced on March 28, 1994. During the trial, defense counsel improperly 
attempted to read a statement in order to refresh a witness1 memory. The state failed to object yet 
the trial court admonished defense counsel in the presence of the jury that he was proceeding 
improperly and informed defense counsel of the proper procedure to refresh a witness' memory (T, 
at 68). 
During the trial defense counsel attempted to make a motion to dismiss on the basis of lack 
of evidence at the conclusion of the state's case in chief. This attempt was made in front of the jury 
and defense counsel was admonished by the trial court that this was improper ((T, at 166). 
Defense counsel waited until the jury was in deliberations to make what was ultimately 
interpreted as an effort to suppress evidence which motion was denied (T, at 219). 
Troy Thomas, a witness of the state, testified that he had narrowed the selection to two 
people and then "picked someone else" when he was identifying the defendant at the lineup. Defense 
counsel failed to probe into the selection process or why Mr. Thomas had changed his mind (T, at 
76). 
Sherry Nostrom, a state witness, could not identify the defendant from the photo line-up (T, 
at 84). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
UCA 77-29-1 requires that a written demand be made to a custodial officer to initiate the 120 
day statutory disposition of the case. Defendant complied with the statute though the state prison 
system did not follow through with his request and defendant was not tried within 120 days. 
Defendant brought a motion to dismiss based upon the state's failure to insure prosecution within 120 
days. The trial court denied the motion on the basis that defendant was brought to trial within 120 
days after his compliance with UCA 77-29-1 and on the basis that it was proper for the trial court to 
grant continuances to the state. 
Defendant further argues that he was not provided with competent counsel as his counsel did 
not properly make a motion to dismiss at the close of the state's case and failed to bring a motion to 
suppress. The prejudice that resulted to the defendant surrounds the fact that the attempt to make 
the motion was made in front of the jury. 
Defendant finally argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. This 
argument is based upon the fact that the only two witnesses to the attempted robbery could not 
adequately identify him. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE. DEFENDANT WAS NOT PROSECUTED WITHIN 120 DAYS AS 
REQUIRED BY UCA 77-29-1. 
UCA 77-29-1 requires, inter alia, that a "written demand" be made to a "custodial officer" of 
"agent" of the same. There is no official form or petition that must be filed to initiate the 120 day 
statutory disposition of the case. In each of the instances cited in the statement of facts, the defendant 
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POINT TWO. THE COUNSEL AFFORDED TO THE DEFENDANT WAS 
INEFFECTIVE. 
During the « " in order to refresh 
a witness' memory. Hie state failed to object yet the ti ial court admonished defense counsel in the 
»fthe hrv that he was proceeding improperly and inioiHied dck:iisi i nmitisel oil lim |IMHM,I 
witness1 mer y. 
AI the conclusion of the state's case, defense counsel attempted to make a motion to dismiss. 
Such attempt Hed by the trial court that 
he should not make the motion. er, defensi «i.u...«m. ..<,.-,» * ivu to make the motion. 
Defense counsel obviously thought that he had sufficient grounds to present 
Ho^ < iHendant was denied the chance to have the motion heard when his defense counsel 
so quickly gave up. 
P u r t j i e r m o r e ^ defeil!S Ihg 
ultimately interpreted as an effort to suppress evidence. Defense counsel was concerned that the 
testimony of Troy Thomas, Sherry Nostrum and Joshua Williams was tainted with respect to 
identific • a motion to suppress prejudiced the 
defendant because the trial court never had the opportunity to review the issue of the adequacy of the 
p h o t O HJlCUj . r - M 
probability that the court would have suppressed the photo lineup evidence. 
Defense counsel's faih ire to properly reft esh the memory of the witness and to improperly 
r ' o dismiss the case prejudiced the defendant. The jury may have based its verdict not so much 
on the evidence, but on the basis of the defense counsel's performance. 
in 
presented a written demand which clearly established his intent to avail himself of the privilege of a 
the statute. In addition, all of the documents referenced in the statement of facts were delivered to 
the custodial officer of the defendant or an appropriate agent of the same as required by UCA 77-29-
1. 
The state had 120 days to bring the case to trial unless the court entered a finding of "good 
cause" for a longer delay. The is nothing in the record that constitutes good cause for the excessive 
delay. The state requested continuances to all three trial settings. The first two requests were 
granted. It is apparent that the requests were nothing more than a delay tactic by the state inasmuch 
as the "essential witness" that was allegedly unavailable on the first trial setting was not even called 
as a witness at the eventual trial. 
In State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court held that the burden 
of complying with UCA 77-29-1 was on the prosecution. The Court further held that the defendant 
was not required to show that he had been prejudiced by the delay. The Court held that if there is 
not good cause for the delay of the trial beyond the statutory time period, then the case must be 
dismissed with prejudice. 
In this case, the request was delivered initially to the transportation officer and later to June 
Hinckley. There is not statutory definition of an "appropriate agent" or "custodial officer" as those 
words are used in UCA 77-29-1. In State v. Phathammovong, 860 P.2d 1001 (Utah App. 1993), the 
court stated that is would not reach a definition of "appropriate agent" because the issue was not 
properly presented at the trial court. Thus, in the present case, the Court should apply the plain 
meaning of those words in determining whether or not the defendant filed an appropriate request. 
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Af« mill in ill iilnn I ilii in presentation b) defense counsel of the defendant fell below the 
objective standard of re s as defined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 688. 10 1 
S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 j i i < i • i (1984). 
P O I N T T H R E E . T H E EVIDENCE W A S mSUKMCIKN'! 1 "Il11 Ill Il i lHTOKT Till'1, 
VERDICT. 
Troy Thomas, a key witness for the prosecution and one of only two witnesses that could 
have placed the defendant i * >l i i v i H I IHI I M I , s t a l c d t h a t h e h a d 
narrowed the selection to two people and then "picked someone else" when he was looking at the 
lineup. Defense counsel failed to probe very deeply into the selection process m I|iy I "» I1 1 "i" MII|MS 
1 ,II 111 i ifihd In i  i inl M i T i n nus indicated that he was not "100 percent sure""", but defense counsel 
did not pursue this line of questioning any fiirther Sheny Nostrum, a key witness for the prosecution 
and the second of only two witnesses llhil mill IMM |>linnl llir (liTiiid'inl in llllin mi'mlr ul1inre could 
not identify the defendant from the photo lineup. 
Inasmuch as there is no evidence which would identify dc.*.ujam « . ;: s 
II i Hi f null Hi i ill ill i I in mi in • nl l lie i i l l m i i i l n l l o b b r n , llic c a s e s h o u l d h a v e b e e n d i s m i s s e d a t t h e t r i a l l e v e l 
as the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant v J within 120 days after he had delivered his written demand 
to his custodial agent The trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss on this basis. nru'v 
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representation afforded to defendant was inadequate as defense counsel made several mistakes that 
prejudiced defendant. Finally, the evidence was insufficient to support a verdict inasmuch as 
defendant was not properly identified as the individual who attempted the robbery. 
Respectfully submitted this 10th day of July, 1995. 
DavidTC. Cundick 
Attorney for defendant/appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that 2 copies of the appellant's brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to Jan 
Graham, Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this 10th day of July, 
1995. 
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